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INTRODUCTION 
What accounts for the tumult over the Bush Administrationís decision to 
ìunsignî the treaty establishing the International Criminal Court (ICC)?1  On 
its face, the decision was not only rational, but to everyoneís benefit.  When 
signing the Rome Statute, President Clinton restated American objections to the 
 
* Assistant Professor, The Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania.  I would like 
to thank the colloquium organizers and its participants, particularly Curt Bradley, Mariano-
Florentino CuÈllar, Eric Posner, and Judith Resnik, for comments at the colloquium and 
afterwards.  Errors remain my own. 
1. The decision was formally conveyed in a letter from Under Secretary of State John 
Bolton to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, see Letter from John R. Bolton, 
Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security, to U.N. Secretary-
General Kofi Annan (May 6, 2002), available at http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/ 
2002/9968.htm, in keeping with the latterís role as the treaty depositary.  Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/9 (1998), 37 I.L.M. 999 [hereinafter 
Rome Statute], available at http://www.un.org/law/icc/statute/romefra.htm.  The decision 
was also announced on the same day by other U.S. officials, who sought to elaborate on its 
rationale.  See Marc Grossman, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, American 
Foreign Policy and the International Criminal Court, Remarks to the Center for Strategic and 
International Studies, Washington, D.C. (May 6, 2002), available at 
http://www.state.gov/p/9949.htm; Pierre-Richard Prosper, U.S. Ambassador for War Crimes 
Issues, Issues Update: US Has No Legal Obligation to the International Criminal Court (May 
6, 2002), available at http://www.wfa.org/issues/wicc/unsigning/prosperunsigning.html; 
Donald Rumsfeld, Secretary Rumsfeld Statement on the ICC Treaty (May 6, 2002), 
available at http://www.defenselink.mil/news/May2002/b05062002_bt233-02.html. 
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ICCís jurisdiction,2 claimed that his intention in signing was to maintain an 
avenue for changing the court,3 and signaled that he would not submit the 
treaty to the Senate unless significant revisions were madeóand would 
recommend that his successor likewise refrain.4  Whatever promise for 
eventual ratification this tack once held disappeared when the Bush 
Administration made known that it sided with the Senate in categorically 
opposing U.S. participation.5  Rather than maintaining an ambiguous or 
duplicitous stance, the United States simply reverted to the status it might have 
retained all alongónamely, that of a nonparty6óby complying punctiliously 
with the notice required by the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, to 
which the United States is not even a party.7  Unsigning, on this view, was 
simply being forthright, and by providing more accurate information about the 
U.S. position, better enabled other signatories and nonparties to promote their 
own interests.8 
Many did not see it that way, however.  The widespread disapproval of the 
U.S. decision is probably easiest to understand in substantive terms.  Those 
having faith in the ICC would have preferred full-fledged U.S. participation, 
and disliked unsigning because it signaled a decisive setback for that 
 
2. William Jefferson Clinton, President of the United States, Statement on Signature of 
the International Criminal Court Treaty, Washington, D.C., at 1 (Dec. 31, 2000), 37 WEEKLY 
COMP. PRES. DOC. 4 (Jan. 8, 2001), available at http://usinfo.state.gov/topical/pol/usandun/ 
00123101.htm. 
3. Id. (ìWith signature, however, we will be in a position to influence the evolution of 
the court.  Without signature, we will not.  Signature will enhance our ability to further 
protect US officials from unfounded charges and to achieve the human rights and 
accountability objectives of the ICC.î). 
4. Id. (ìThe United States should have the chance to observe and assess the functioning 
of the court, over time, before choosing to become subject to its jurisdiction.  Given these 
concerns, I will not, and do not recommend that my successor . . . submit the treaty to the 
Senate for advice and consent until our fundamental concerns are satisfied.î). 
5. For early indications, see Bill Nichols, Bush Voices Objection to Court Treaty, USA 
TODAY, Jan. 3, 2001, at 6A (noting opposition by President-elect Bush and Secretary of 
Defense-nominee Donald Rumsfeld, as well as Senate opposition); David R. Sands, Powell 
Previews Bush Agenda, WASH. TIMES, Jan. 18, 2001, at A3 (describing confirmation 
hearings for Secretary of State-nominee Colin Powell, and concluding from his remarks that 
the Rome Statute would be ìquickly abandonedî). 
6. As President Clinton noted in signing the treaty, however, one of the principal U.S. 
objections to the Rome Statute was its concern that the court could exercise authority over 
the personnel of nonparty states.  See Clinton, supra note 2 (noting that ì[i]n particular, we 
are concerned that when the court comes into existence, it will not only exercise authority 
over personnel of states that have ratified the Treaty, but also claim jurisdiction over 
personnel of states that have notî). 
7. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 18, opened for signature May 23, 
1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 8 I.L.M. 679 (1969) (entered into force Jan. 27, 1980) [hereinafter 
Vienna Convention]; see infra text accompanying note 45 (quoting article 18). 
8. See Steven Mufson & Alan Sipress, UN Funds in Crossfire over Court, WASH. 
POST, Aug. 16, 2001, at A1 (citing senior administration officialís opinion that, given Senate 
opposition to the Rome Statute, providing notice of unsigning ìwould arguably just be 
stating the truthî). 
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possibilityóand the end to any obligation the United States assumed as a 
signatory.  But this substantive explanation is also incomplete.  The United 
Statesís longstanding objections to certain basic aspects of the courtís 
operation, and its failure (despite concerted effort) to persuade other 
negotiating states of those objectionsí merits, make it implausible that 
remaining a signatory would have led it to participate harmoniously in the new 
regime9ólet alone to engage in what Harold Koh has labeled ìan international 
Marbury versus Madison moment.î10  If so, ICC-based objections to unsigning 
were either highly optimistic or preoccupied with the gestureís symbolism.11 
International lawyers also regarded the mere act of unsigning as significant 
in itself.  Some seemed to think it impossible,12 and the European Unionís 
 
9. See, e.g., Diane Marie Amann & M.N.S. Sellers, The United States of America and 
the International Criminal Court, 50 AM. J. COMP. L. 381, 404 (2002) (concluding prior to 
unsigning that, given political opposition within the United States and the defeat of U.S.-
proposed revisions, ìthe United States is very unlikely either to join or to support the 
International Criminal Court at any time in the foreseeable futureî).  For a thorough 
explication of the reasons for signingóalbeit on the assumption that U.S. ratification 
remained tenableósee David J. Scheffer, Staying the Course with the International Criminal 
Court, 35 CORNELL INTíL L.J. 47, 55-68 (2002).  See also id. at 73-86 (describing progress 
achieved in resolving U.S. objections); id. at 98-99 (describing steps that might be taken to 
resolve continuing concerns). 
10. Neil A. Lewis, U.S. Is Set to Renounce Its Role in Pact for World Tribunal, N.Y. 
TIMES, May 5, 2002, at A18. 
11. I do not mean to suggest that such concerns were misplaced, or that the bases for 
U.S. opposition (and, ultimately, the unsigning) were persuasive, but only to focus attention 
on the nature of the criticisms lodged against the ultimate decision to unsign.  It is important 
to consider, certainly, whether the act of unsigning was harmful because it was perceived as 
part of a broader U.S. rejection of cooperative internationalism.  It bears mention, however, 
that the United Statesís aggressive negotiating position during the development of the Rome 
Statute had already given rise to that perception, well before the treaty was (surprisingly) 
signed, and it may be doubted whether any active attempt by the United States to renew its 
campaign would have been welcome.  Cf. William K. Lietzau, International Criminal Law 
After Rome: Concerns from a U.S. Military Perspective, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter 
2001, at 119, 119 (describing perception that cheers by delegates approving the text of the 
Rome Statute were  ìas much to celebrate the defeat of the United States, which had 
demanded the vote, as they were to applaud the adoption of the textî). 
12. It was unclear whether this objection was legal or just semantic.  See Michael J. 
Kelly, Imperfect Justice, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Feb. 7, 2001, at B7 (ìAmerica has already 
signed the document.  It cannot be ëunsigned.í  Upon signature, the U.S. committed itself 
under international law to refrain from acting in any manner to undermine the object and 
purpose of the treaty.  Consequently, we are already obligated to back the creation of this 
court.î); accord Michael J. Kelly, Ignoring Criminal Treaty Harms U.S. Legacy, USA 
TODAY, Apr. 16, 2002, at 12A.  This view was, I should stress, unrepresentative.  See, e.g., 
Anthony Aust, Letter to the Editor, FIN. TIMES (London), May 9, 2002, at 18 (explaining that 
unsigning ìsets no legal precedentî); Anthony Aust, Letter to the Editor, TIMES (London), 
Apr. 5, 2002, at 25 (explaining that the interim obligation ceases ìonce the state ha[s] made 
it clear that it will not ratify, and that has been evident for a long timeî); Curtis Bradley, U.S. 
Announces Intent Not to Ratify International Criminal Court Treaty, ASIL INSIGHTS, May 
2002 (explaining that providing notice of intent not to sign is consistent with the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties), available at http://www.asil.org/insights/insigh87.htm. 
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official reaction hedged as to its effect.13  It was, in any event, apparently 
unprecedented,14 and a precedent some considered troubling.  U.S. officials and 
their political supporters urged the unsigning of a number of important treaties 
that the United States has signed but not yet ratifiedósuch as the Kyoto 
Protocol, the Biodiversity Treaty, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child, and the ILO Convention on Race 
Discrimination in Employment.15  Other states, such as Israel, are considering 
the possibility with respect to the Rome Statute.16  Given the number of 
unratified signatures to multilateral treaties, not to mention the number of 
multilateral treaties still open to signature, the scope of the obligation imposed 
on signatoriesóand the limits, if any, to unsigningóare questions of 
considerable moment to treaty law.  The former head of the U.S. delegation to 
the ICC negotiations cautioned that ìthere is a whole list of treaties that weíve 
ratified that other states have signed but not yet ratified. . . . If we ëunsigní the 
ICC, we give a signal that a new practice is acceptable, and we lay the 
 
13. Declaration by the Presidency on Behalf of the European Union on the Position of 
the US Towards the International Criminal Court (May 13, 2002), available at 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/human_rights/doc/declicc.htm (noting ìwith 
disappointment and regretî the U.S. declaration that it does not intend to ratify the Rome 
Statute ìand th[a]t it considers itself released from any legal obligation arising from its 
signature of the Statuteî (emphasis added)). 
14. See, e.g., William J. Aceves, The Presidentís Roman Holiday, SAN DIEGO UNION-
TRIB., Sept. 5, 2002, at B11 (describing unsigning as ìunique in the history of international 
law,î with ìU.N. officials indicat[ing] that no such precedent existsî); Lewis, supra note 10 
(citing concurring views of U.N. and former U.S. officials). 
15. Jeremy Rabkin, End Them, Donít Mend Them, WKLY. STANDARD, Jan. 22, 2001, at 
18; see also David C. Scott, Presidential Power to ìUn-signî Treaties, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 
1447, 1447-48 (2002) (discussing background to President George W. Bushís position that 
the United States should ìescape permanentlyî from the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty 
(CTBT)).  Professor Rabkin also highlighted the possibility of unsigning the 1997 
amendments to the ABM Treaty, but the United States subsequently gave formal notice that 
it would withdraw from the underlying ABM Treaty altogether.  Text of Diplomatic Notes 
Sent to Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine (Dec. 14, 2001), at 
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2001/6859.htm; Press Release, President Discusses 
National Missile Defense (Dec. 13, 2001), at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/ 
2001/12/print/20011213-4.html; infra text accompanying note 113; cf. Letter from Michael 
Posner, Executive Director, Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, to President George W. 
Bush (Apr. 4, 2002), available at http://www.lchr.org/IJP/icc.htm (predicting that ICC 
unsigning would ì[o]pen the floodgate to disaffected interested groups of all stripes seeking 
to roll back U.S. signature on any number of treaties,î and citing examples); Letter from 
Kenneth Roth, Executive Director, to President George W. Bush (May 3, 2002), 
http://www.hrw.org/press/2002/05/icc0506-ltr.htm (suggesting similar dynamic for United 
States and other signatories). 
16. Harvey Morris, Legal Move to Halt Israeli Assassinations, FIN. TIMES (London), 
July 26, 2002, at 13. 
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groundwork for undermining a whole range of treaties,î17 including for other 
states desirably constrained by international law.18 
Unsigning exposed a potentially significant flaw in the prevailing law of 
treaties.19  Part I briefly explicates the legal consequences of signature under 
the Vienna Convention, which is generally regarded as establishing default 
rules for bilateral and multilateral treaties between states.20  As the relative 
significance of ratification has increased, international lawyers have wrestled 
with how to maintain the legal significance of treaty signatures; at least 
following the Vienna Convention, the majority view is that ìmereî signatories 
(states that have signed but not yet ratified the treaty in question) assume an 
intermediate, interim obligation to refrain from frustrating the treatyís object 
and purpose. 
Part II, the heart of this Article, considers the interim obligation as a 
potential solution to the strategic problems posed by signature.  Within the 
formalist perspective predominant among international lawyers, the interim 
obligation is understood as a mechanism for retaining a vestigial role for 
signature.  I reconceive the interim obligation as a partial answer to ex post and 
ex ante commitment problems observable in the treaty context and elsewhere, 
but conclude that it is unable to resolve them satisfactorily.  Were interim 
obligations made effective, moreover, they would still destabilize multilateral 
treaty regimes, since signatories can effectively withdraw from their obligations 
without the delay that withdrawal provisions impose on ratifiers. 
What, if anything, is to be done?  Part III continues with an assessment of 
the alternative legal mechanisms for addressing these strategic problems.  After 
considering other options, I propose a simple means of reducing the exit gap 
 
17. Mufson & Sipress, supra note 8. 
18. See, e.g., Ian Williams, Mary Quite Contrary, IN THESE TIMES (Chicago), Oct. 14, 
2002, at 16 (citing opinion of Mary Robinson, outgoing U.N. Commissioner on Human 
Rights, that ì[n]ow if other countries are under pressure on human rights instruments theyíve 
signed, they may say, ëWell, if the U.S. can unsign a treaty, so can we.íî (internal quotation 
marks omitted)); Letter from Michael Posner, supra note 15 (arguing that ICC unsigning 
would ì[e]ncourage autocratic leaders to ignore the international commitments,î citing ìthe 
U.S. precedent to justify backing out of international commitments that are important to the 
U.S.î). 
19. For reasons of space, I do not here address the constitutional questions that interim 
obligations poseóchiefly for divided power systems like the United States, where the 
Presidentís ability to bind the United States without Senate advice and consent is potentially 
controversial.  For discussions focusing on these domestic questions, see MICHAEL J. 
GLENNON, CONSTITUTIONAL DIPLOMACY 169-75 (1990); Scott, supra note 15. 
20. As explained below, many states are not parties to the Vienna Convention, but it is 
commonly regarded as stating the customary international law applicable to the questions 
relevant hereóand a number of nonratifying parties, including the United States, have 
declared as much.  See infra text accompanying note 82.  It is important to stress, however, 
that for parties and nonparties alike, the Vienna Convention only states default principles of 
treaty law, and individual treaties may directly or indirectly provide for a different rule. 
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between withdrawal mechanisms and unsigning that diminishes any strategic 
opportunities created by this emerging practice. 
I.  THE FORMAL LEGAL CONSEQUENCES OF SIGNATURE 
The history of the law of treaties, greatly simplified, supports a shift in 
gravity from signature to ratification.21  Signature was generally regarded as 
sufficient between monarchs or, for that matter, between their duly authorized 
representatives.  Even in the early twentieth century, dictators sometimes 
personally negotiated, signed, and through those acts made binding treaties 
along much the same lines.22  But separate ratification procedures also have an 
ancient pedigree in international relations, have come to be required by 
numerous national constitutions, and are now the default procedure for 
international agreements.23 
The relationship among negotiating authority, signature, and ratification 
raises a host of technical issues, but at least one of potential consequence:  If 
ratification is required before a state can become a party, what significance 
 
21. To be clear, I use ìratifyî and ìratificationî in the sense used by international 
lawyersóthat is, to refer to a conclusive act by which a state party communicates its consent 
to an international agreement to its treaty partners.  See Vienna Convention, supra note 7, 
art. 2 (explaining that for purposes of the Convention, ìëratificationí, ëacceptanceí, 
ëapprovalí and ëaccessioní mean in each case the international act so named whereby a State 
establishes on the international plane its consent to be bound by a treatyî).  Ratification is 
also used to refer to internal procedures (like those under Article II of the U.S. Constitution) 
that national law requires as a condition precedent for ratification in the international law 
sense.  The link between national and international procedures is obviously quite strong.  But 
it is possible that a treaty may be ratified in the international sense without having properly 
been ratified according to domestic procedures, or that a treaty may have been ratified for 
domestic purposes without having been satisfactorily communicated on the international 
plane.  See, e.g., G.G. Fitzmaurice, Do Treaties Need Ratification?, 15 Brit. Y.B. Intíl L. 
113, 113-15 (1934). 
22. JOS… SETTE CAMARA, THE RATIFICATION OF INTERNATIONAL TREATIES 19-26 
(1949); INGRID DETTER, ESSAYS ON THE LAW OF TREATIES 18 (1967); FRANCIS O. WILCOX, 
THE RATIFICATION OF INTERNATIONAL CONVENTIONS 21-23 (1935); Fitzmaurice, supra note 
21, at 119; Harvard Research in Intíl Law, Law of Treaties, 29 AM. J. INTíL L. 653, 770 
(1935) [hereinafter Harvard Research]. 
23. CAMARA, supra note 22, at 26-47; WILCOX, supra note 22, at 28-30; John Eugene 
Harley, The Obligation to Ratify Treaties, 13 AM. J. INTíL L. 389, 389-93 (1919).  But cf. 
KAYE HOLLOWAY, MODERN TRENDS IN TREATY LAW 40 (1967) (claiming broadly, and 
implausibly, that ì[o]ne of the most significant aspects of trends in the evolution of treaty 
law has been the growing importance of signature in all its aspectsî).  Ratification is not, to 
be sure, invariably required, but it has become the norm.  Compare Fitzmaurice, supra note 
21, at 129 (contending that ratification is unnecessary unless expressly or implicitly required 
by a particular treaty), and Vienna Convention, supra note 7, art. 11 (recognizing that 
treaties may provide for consent by ìsignature, exchange of instruments constituting a treaty, 
ratification, acceptance, approval or accession, or by any other means if so agreedî), with 
CAMARA, supra note 22, at 43-44 (noting that in practice, ratification is ìessentially 
necessaryî in light of overwhelming practice), and Vienna Convention, supra note 7, art. 12 
(detailing conditions under which consent may be indicated by signature alone). 
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remains for prior acts, particularly signature?  To be sure, signature has some 
recognizable, if often overlooked, consequences.  Collectively, signature tends 
to fix the treatyís substantive termsóat least in the absence of reservations.24  
It also establishes the terms by which a treaty is to come into force, such as by 
setting a time limit for ratification or stipulating the minimum number of 
signatories.25 
Commentators puzzled, however, over the significance of individual 
signatures for state consent, a problem made more acute by widespread and 
prolonged delays in ratification.26  Some conceded that the signature lacked 
any legal effect,27 but most shrunk from such a nihilistic view.  At the opposite 
end of the spectrum, some claimed that signature created an obligation to 
ratify.28  But this would basically divest ratification of significance, and in the 
process slight the functional arguments for it.  Because adding discrete stages 
to the consent process may improve the likelihood of cooperation, rendering 
ratification redundant may harm the objectives of treatymaking.29  Moreover, 
to the extent that domestic ratification processes broaden participationóas in 
the United States, where ratification increases public scrutiny, requires 
legislative participation, and presents the executive branch with a second 
 
24. Reservations are not, in fact, universally permitted.  The Rome Statute, for 
example, formally precluded them.  Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 20.  In practice, 
however, some states appear to have secured their functional equivalent.  See Ruth 
Wedgwood, The Irresolution of Rome, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter 2001, at 193, 194-
95 (citing examples of the prohibitionís application and circumvention). 
25. See J. MERVYN JONES, FULL POWERS AND RATIFICATION 86 & n.2 (1949).  
Signature may also invest the signatory with particular rights under the treaty.  See infra text 
accompanying notes 57, 106. 
26. See, e.g., JONES, supra note 25, at 105-22. 
27. See, e.g., Quincy Wright, Conflicts Between International Law and Treaties, 11 
AM. J. INTíL L. 566, 568 n.9 (1917) (contending that ìa state which has signed but not 
ratified a treaty is legally in the same situation as a state which has had nothing to do with 
the instrumentî). 
28. See Harley, supra note 23, at 404 (compiling authorities); Harvard Research, supra 
note 22, at 770-72 (same). 
29. John K. Setear, An Iterative Perspective on Treaties: A Synthesis of International 
Relations Theory and International Law, 37 HARV. INTíL L.J. 139, 148-50, 193-96 (1996) 
[hereinafter Setear, An Iterative Perspective] (discussing signature as an iterative stage in 
treatymaking); John K. Setear, Law in the Service of Politics: Moving Neo-Liberal 
Institutionalism from Metaphor to Theory by Using the International Treaty Process to 
Define ìIteration,î 37 VA. J. INTíL L. 641, 682-89 (1997) (same).  Setear recognizes that 
iteration models apply imperfectly to treatymaking, since (among other things) the graduated 
structure of interactions is not the same as repeat plays to a game.  On the other hand, it 
should be noted that weak concerns about making ratification redundantófor example, that 
signature and ratification might become functionally indistinguishableówould be 
redemptive, rather than unfortunate, under the iteration model. 
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opportunity to evaluate the treatyórequiring ratification on the international 
plane may improve the credibility of treaty commitments.30 
In any event, the argument for an obligation to ratify faded for more 
conventional reasons.  Such an obligation may have made more sense when 
diplomats were regarded as personal agents of a head of state, and could be 
viewed in terms of a conventional principal-agent relationship, but identifying 
the principal (conceivably, the head of state, a legislature, or the state itself), 
the agent (not only the envoy, but the head of state, too), and the nature and 
consequences of delegated authority became less straightforward.31  Any such 
obligation also had to confront the fact that states frequently do not ratify 
treaties that they have signed, which is powerful evidence that no such 
principle existed as a matter of customary international law.32  Perhaps mindful 
of that problem, those presupposing a legal obligation to ratify, and even the 
greater number regarding any such obligation as purely moral in character, 
imagined categories of acceptable excuses:  The exceeding of negotiating 
powers, duress, conflict with prior or otherwise superior legal norms, or 
fundamental changes in circumstances were all regarded as permissible bases 
for nonratification.33  By the time the Harvard Research in International Law 
project was compiling a code of treaty law, it felt comfortable stating 
conclusively that there was no duty whatsoever to ratify a signed treaty.34  
Special Rapporteurs to the International Law Commissionís subsequent efforts 
at codification, which formed the basis for what became the Vienna 
Convention, urged inclusion of a binding legal duty ì[t]o submit the instrument 
to the proper constitutional authorities for examination with the view to 
ratification,î35 but admitted that such a duty went beyond what existing law 
 
30. See John K. Setear, The Presidentís Rational Choice of a Treatyís Preratification 
Pathway: Article II, Congressional-Executive Agreement, or Executive Agreement?, 31 J. 
LEGAL STUD. S5 (2002). 
31. See JONES, supra note 25, at 87 (noting strained character of agency under modern 
practice). 
32. See, e.g., Harley, supra note 23, at 397-403 (discussing examples); Harvard 
Research, supra note 22, at 775-77 (citing frequency of failures to ratify, and absence of 
their condemnation under international law); cf. Statute of the International Court of Justice, 
June 26, 1945, art. 38, 59 Stat. 1055, 1060, 3 Bevans 1153, 1187 (defining sources of law to 
include ìinternational custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as lawî). 
33. See, e.g., WILCOX, supra note 22, at 103-04; Harley, supra note 23, at 397; see also 
CAMARA, supra note 22, at 33-34 (noting ìelasticî nature of exceptions); Harvard Research, 
supra note 22, at 771-73 (describing arguments favoring moral or legal obligations to ratify 
and their qualifications). 
34. Harvard Research, supra note 22, at 769 (stating, in article 8 of proposed code, that 
ì[t]he signature of a treaty on behalf of a State does not create for that State an obligation to 
ratify the treatyî). 
35. Report by Mr. H. Lauterpacht, Special Rapporteur to the General Assembly, [1953] 
2 Y.B. Intíl L. Commín 90, 108, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1953/Add.1 [hereinafter 
Lauterpacht Report] (detailing proposed article 5(2)(a)). 
SWAINE 6/1/2003  12:35 PM 
May 2003] UNSIGNING 2069 
provided,36 and that, together with the obligationís vague character, ultimately 
doomed it.37 
A third, intermediate possibility was that ratification, though necessary to 
make an obligation binding, had an effect retroactive to the time of signature.38  
Whatever the potential merits of that rule, it too was regarded as inconsistent 
with the migration from ratification of the signature to ratification as a 
separable mechanism for indicating consent.39  By the time of the Harvard 
Research project in 1935, retroactive ratification was considered ìobsolete,î40 a 
judgment reiterated in the International Law Commissionís proceedings.41 
A fourth possibility, that endorsed by the Harvard project,42 the 
International Law Commission,43 and ultimately by those negotiating the 
 
36. Id. at 111. 
37. See Report by G.G. Fitzmaurice, Special Rapporteur, [1956] 2 Y.B. Intíl L. 
Commín 104, 113, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/101 (explicating proposed article 30); First Report on 
the Law of Treaties by Sir Humphrey Waldock, Special Rapporteur, [1962] 2 Y.B. Intíl L. 
Commín 27, 46, 47, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/144 (replicating similar duty, but noting lack of legal 
basis and ìtenuous and imperfectî nature); Summary Records of the 14th Session, [1962] 1 
Y.B. Intíl L. Commín 88, 88-96 (summarizing criticisms at the International Law 
Commissionís 644th Meeting); id. at 96-100 (summarizing criticisms, and rejection of 
proposal, at the International Law Commissionís 645th meeting); Fourth Report on the Law 
of Treaties by Sir Humphrey Waldock, Special Rapporteur, [1965] 2 Y.B. Intíl L. Commín 3, 
36, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/177 & addenda 1, 2 (explaining redaction); see also Richard D. 
Kearney & Robert E. Dalton, The Treaty on Treaties, 64 AM. J. INTíL L. 495, 509 (1970) 
(describing rejection of similarly progressive proposal that states must refrain from acts 
tending to frustrate treaty objects during negotiations). 
38. See, e.g., JONES, supra note 25, at 92-107; J. Mervyn Jones, The Retroactive Effect 
of the Ratification of Treaties, 29 AM. J. INTíL L. 51 (1935); see also Montault v. United 
States, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 47, 51 (1851) (holding that a treaty is binding as of the date of its 
signature); United States v. Reynes, 50 U.S. (9 How.) 127, 148 (1850) (opining that treaties 
ìmust be considered as binding from the period of their execution; their operation must be 
understood to take effect from that period, unless it shall, by some condition or stipulation in 
the compact itself, be postponedî); United States v. Arredondo, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 691, 748 
(1832) (stating that a treaty relates back to the date of agreement between the two 
governments for purposes of intergovernmental rights); Certain German Interests in Polish 
Upper Silesia (Ger. v. Pol.), 1926 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 7 (May 25), at 29-31. 
39. See JONES, supra note 25, at 64-65; Joni S. Charme, The Interim Obligation of 
Article 18 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties: Making Sense of an Enigma, 25 
GEO. WASH. J. INTíL L. & ECON. 71, 85-87 (1992). 
40. Harvard Research, supra note 22, at 780 (citing, and endorsing, Mavrommatis 
Palestine Concessions (Greece v. Gr. Brit.), 1924 P.C.I.J. (ser A) No. 2 (Aug. 30), at 57 
(Moore, J., dissenting)). 
41. See Charme, supra note 39, at 87-88 (citing Summary Records of the 647th 
Meeting, [1962] 1 Y.B. Intíl L. Commín 111, 117, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1962). 
42. Article 9 provided that 
[u]nless otherwise provided in the treaty itself, a State on behalf of which a treaty has been 
signed is under no duty to perform the obligations stipulated, prior to the coming into force 
of the treaty with respect to that State; under some circumstances, however, good faith may 
require that pending the coming into force of the treaty the State shall, for a reasonable time 
after signature, refrain from taking action which would render performance by any party of 
the obligations stipulated impossible or more difficult. 
Harvard Research, supra note 22, at 778. 
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Vienna Convention, was to redeem the signature by imposing a distinct duty on 
signatories.  A handful of cases decided following World War I indicated that 
signatoriesóincluding, at least arguably, mere signatoriesóassumed some 
kind of duty not to disrupt the treatyís operation.44  In that spirit, article 18 of 
the Vienna Convention provides that: 
 
43. The Commissionís final draft of 1966 proposed in article 15 that 
[a] State is obliged to refrain from acts tending to frustrate the object of a proposed treaty 
when: 
(a) It has agreed to enter into negotiations for the conclusion of the treaty, while these 
negotiations are in progress; 
(b) It has signed the treaty subject to ratification, acceptance or approval, until it shall have 
made its intentions clear not to become a party to the treaty; 
(c) It has expressed its consent to be bound by the treaty, pending the entry into force of 
the treaty and provided that such entry into force is not unduly delayed. 
Reports of the Commission to the General Assembly, [1966] 2 Y.B. Intíl L. Commín 202, 
U.N. Doc. A/6309/Rev. 
44. The cases commonly cited did not involve mere signatoriesóin the sense of parties 
that had signed a treaty, but had not taken the discretionary step of ratifying itóbut instead 
involved the duties of state parties who, for one reason or another, were not yet parties to a 
treaty in force at the time of the relevant acts.  Thus, the Turkish-Greek Mixed Arbitration 
Tribunal held that Turkey had acted unlawfully in seizing the property of a Greek national 
after Turkey had signed a peace treaty with Greece, but before the treaty had entered into 
force, since ì[f]rom the time of the signature of the Treaty and before its entry into force the 
contracting parties were under the duty to do nothing which might impair the operation of its 
clauses.î  Megalidis v. Turkey, 8 RECUEIL DES DECISIONS DES TRIBUNAUX MIXTES 386, 395 
(Turkish-Greek Mixed Arb. Trib. 1928), reprinted in 1927/28 ANN. DIG. PUB. INTíL L. 395 
(Arnold D. McNair & H. Lauterpacht eds., 1931).  The decision is generally regarded as the 
only true precedent for the interim obligation.  Paul V. McDade, The Interim Obligation 
Between Signature and Ratification of a Treaty, 32 NETH. INTíL L. REV. 5, 14 (1985); Martin 
A. Rogoff, The International Legal Obligations of Signatories to an Unratified Treaty, 32 
ME. L. REV. 263, 277 (1980); cf. JONES, supra note 25, at 81-83 (finding other precedent 
wanting).  Some commentators have suggested that the decisionís precedential force may be 
limited because the conduct was an international delict even absent the treaty.  See, e.g., 
Charme, supra note 39, at 81 & n.39; Rogoff, supra, at 277-78. 
The greater weakness, in my view, is that these and other cases typically evaluated the 
behavior of states that had ultimately become parties to the treaty, rather than those that 
definitively had refrained or whose status had not been resolved by the time of the 
decisionóthus permitting the tribunals to assume that the states concerned had decided that 
observing the treaty served their national interests.  Indeed, the realistic prospect of 
nonratification is not discussed in these cases, and there are indications that any such 
possibility would cut against state responsibility.  In one case, an umpire rejected a claim by 
a Mexican national for property damages caused by American troops following the signing 
of a peace treaty, but prior to Senate ratification.  The umpire noted that ìit is well 
understood that a peace is not a complete peace until ratified,î and that ìthe ratifying 
authority has the power of refusing unless, for that time, it has given up this power 
beforehand.î  Ignacio Torres v. United States, No. 565 (Zacualtipan Claims, The American 
and Mexican Joint Commission 1868), reprinted in 4 JOHN B. MOORE, HISTORY AND DIGEST 
OF THE INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATIONS TO WHICH THE UNITED STATES HAS BEEN A PARTY 
3798, 3801 (1898).  In language more widely quoted, however, he noted in dicta that ìif a 
peace were signed with a moral certainty of its ratification and one of the belligerents 
were . . . making grants of land in a province which is to be ceded, before the final 
ratification, it would certainly be considered . . . a fraudulent and invalid transaction.î  Id. 
(emphasis added). 
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A State is obliged to refrain from acts which would defeat the object and 
purpose of a treaty when: 
(a) It has signed the treaty or has exchanged instruments constituting the 
treaty subject to ratification, acceptance or approval, until it shall have made 
its intention clear not to become a party to the treaty; or 
(b) It has expressed its consent to be bound by the treaty, pending the entry 
into force of the treaty and provided that such entry into force is not unduly 
delayed.45 
As explained in slightly greater detail below, article 18ís terms, and its 
influence, are unclear.46  But its dominance as a legal tactic for coping with the 
diminished checks on treaty signatures is beyond dispute.  The Vienna 
Convention made no attempt to revive signature as the legally definitive 
juncture for state consent, and there has been little attempt to do so outside the 
Convention.  Similarly, the Convention bypassed the opportunity to endorse the 
civil law principle of culpa in contrahendo, according to which liability may be 
imposed for bad faith conduct during negotiations.47  Even if the failure to 
adopt such alternatives is of little assistance in interpreting article 18,48 the 
choice to adopt exclusively the interim obligation approachówhich has been 
followed by commentators and non-parties as well49ómakes it relatively easy 
to assess the default rules for treaty formation. 
II.  SIGNATURE AS A STRATEGIC PROBLEM 
With occasional exceptions, the debates in the literature about what to do 
with signature in the age of ratification have been based in, and limited by, 
doctrinal considerations.50  The focus is understandable, given the usual 
 
45. See Vienna Convention, supra note 7, art. 18. 
46. See infra Part II.B.  For fuller legal analyses of article 18, see Charme, supra note 
39; Maria Frankowska, The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties Before United States 
Courts, 28 VA. J. INTíL L. 281 (1988); Jan Klabbers, How to Defeat a Treatyís Object and 
Purpose Pending Entry into Force: Towards Manifest Intent, 34 VAND. J. TRANSNATíL L. 
283 (2001); McDade, supra note 44, at 9-28; Rogoff, supra note 44. 
47. See Charme, supra note 39, at 93-98. 
48. See id. at 85-98 (reviewing the implicit failure of the drafters to adopt these 
alternatives, but cautioning that they provide ìlimited insight into the content of the 
obligationî). 
49. For example, as discussed below, the United Statesówhich is not a party to the 
Vienna Conventionóhas become convinced that it states customary international law on this 
matter, see infra text accompanying note 82, and the same approach has been adopted by the 
American Law Institute.  See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW ß 312(3) 
(1987) (ìPrior to the entry into force of an international agreement, a state that has signed the 
agreement or expressed its consent to be bound is obliged to refrain from acts that would 
defeat the object and purpose of the agreement.î). 
50. The problem has not been addressed even in works considering the strategic issues 
posed by treaties.  See, e.g., RICHARD B. BILDER, MANAGING THE RISKS OF INTERNATIONAL 
AGREEMENT (1981) (discussing risk-management techniques in the formation of treaties); 
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domain and expertise of international lawyers; even the Vienna Convention, 
which afforded the opportunity to develop new norms, sought (nominally, at 
least) only to state preexisting principles of customary international law.51  But 
here, as elsewhere, the doctrinal focus has tended to obscure questions 
potentially of concern to states. 
A.   Ex Post and Ex Ante Considerations 
The essential ambition, from a doctrinal point of view, has been to 
establish some legal significance for the signature within the process of 
consent.52  The Harvard Research project augmented somewhat its case for an 
interim obligation by citing the desirability, as a matter of principle, of 
protecting the legitimate expectations of other signatories.53  Sir Hersch 
Lauterpachtís report for the International Law Commission echoed that 
argument, explaining that the purpose of the rule supporting an interim 
obligation on signatories ìis to prohibit action in bad faith deliberately aiming 
at depriving the other party of the benefits which it legitimately hoped to 
achieve from the treaty and for which it gave adequate consideration.î54  His 
arguments for retaining significance for signaturesóand more particularly in 
support of the distinct, and unsuccessful, proposal that states should be legally 
obliged to seek the ratification of signed treatiesóalso sounded, 
unconvincingly, in contractual terms.55 
 
ARIE E. DAVID, THE STRATEGY OF TREATY TERMINATION: LAWFUL BREACHES AND 
RETALIATIONS (1975) (discussing decisionmaking in terminating and revising treaties). 
51. See generally I.M. SINCLAIR, THE VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF TREATIES 
1-26 (1973) (describing tension in the Vienna Convention between progressive development 
of customary law and its codification). 
52. See, e.g., Harvard Research, supra note 22, at 780 (submitting that ì[i]t is believed 
that when a duly authorized plenipotentiary signs a treaty on behalf of his State, the signature 
is not a simple formality devoid of all juridical effect and involving no obligation whatever, 
moral or legal, on the part of the State whose signature the treaty bearsî).  For a more recent 
example of this formalistic approach, see Charme, supra note 39, at 89 (arguing that 
ìviewing ratification, acceptance or approval as the exclusive means by which a state 
manifests consent renders the act of signature meaninglessî; ì[t]hus, any interpretation of 
article 18 which exalts the importance of ratification, acceptance or approval to the total 
detriment of the role of signature, would run counter to the two-stage modelî).  Note, 
however, that even if a signature imposes no immediate behavioral constraints on the signing 
state, it may nonetheless have legal consequences for the terms and operation of the signed 
instrument.  See supra text accompanying notes 24-25. 
53. Harvard Research, supra note 22, at 780-81. 
54. Lauterpacht Report, supra note 35, at 110. 
55. Id. at 109-10. 
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1.   Ex post effects. 
Lurking within Lauterpachtís doctrinal objections, however, were some 
practical concerns.  A signatory could be influential, he recalled, in shaping the 
procedural and substantive terms of treaties.  States making concessions to that 
signatory, and lured by its signature into signing themselves, would feel their 
concession had been ìmade in vain seeing that the consideration that they 
legitimetely [sic] expect[ed] will not be forthcoming.î56  Mere signatories, he 
added, were often entitled to a voice in determining the admissibility of another 
stateís reservations and with respect to accessions, and it would be ìproperî to 
obligate them somehow in exchange for those rights.57 
These and kindred accounts seem facially plausible, though their details 
require further unpacking.  If a state were to take a hard line in negotiations, 
and if it were sufficiently worthwhile to secure its participation, other states 
might be induced to make concessions in order to secure its signature.  
Lauterpachtís concern seemed to be that the hard-line state, left free to ignore 
its signature, could act to the disadvantage of other signatories.  But in a world 
where treaty signature imposed no legal duties, any other signatory would be 
equally free to betray its commitments, so the two might deter one anotheróor, 
at the very least, permit the betrayed signatory adequate recourse.  One might 
further assume, of course, that other mere signatories will be victimized 
because they behave more honorably, but it is difficult to imagine that 
imbalance persisting for long. 
The multilateral setting is more difficult to manage.  One concern is that 
mere signatories can, during the course of treaty negotiations, extract terms that 
impose costs on the other signatoriesóbut costs that are not so substantial as to 
warrant collective renegotiation of the treatyís terms when it becomes apparent 
that the treacherous signatory will not adhere.  Second, other signatories may 
have actually ratified the treaty, imposing upon themselves an obligation to 
adhere to its terms at least with respect to other signatories.  Perhaps, in 
retrospect, they ought to have waited, but having gone aheadóperhaps in the 
accurate expectation that a sufficient number of others would do likewiseó
they may be vulnerable to treaty-inconsistent behavior by mere signatories.58 
 
56. Id. at 110.  In the instance of the ICC, for example, the European Commissioner for 
External Relations accused the United States of ìrefusing to take yes for an answer,î and 
asked ì[w]hy should people make concessions to America if the United States is going to 
walk away in any case?î  Chris Patten, Why Does America Fear This Court?, WASH. POST, 
July 9, 2002, at A21.  Others suggested that the U.S. signature had perhaps encouraged 
others to sign, and even to ratify.  Hilary Charlesworth, Clintonís Policy a Triumph for 
Justice, AUSTRALIAN, Jan. 18, 2001, at 11. 
57. Charlesworth, supra note 56.  Under the Rome Statute, for example, reservations 
were not permitted, see supra note 24, but signatories were entitled to observer status in the 
Assembly of States Parties.  Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 112. 
58. This makes sense, for example, of the allegation that the United States had 
developed ìa new ëbrinkmanshipí approach to treaty negotiations, accompanying everyone 
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2.   Ex ante effects. 
If these scenarios seem overly exotic and anecdotal, more systematic, ex 
ante effects can be identified.  Where parties are free to exit a relationship at 
any point and for any reason, they will under-invest in relianceóthat is, fail to 
depend upon the relationshipís perpetuation in ways that might be efficient.59  
In the treaty context, such under-investment can take several forms.  States may 
decide not to negotiate at all if they believe that signatures are unreliable, and 
may even invest their resources in activities inconsistent with what would 
otherwise be the treaty regimeósuch as in pursuing treaty relations with other 
partners, or acting unilaterally.  If they elect nonetheless to negotiate, they may 
be inclined to agree to less exacting terms than would be ideal, if and to the 
extent that those terms would impose fewer costs if one side reneged on its 
signature.  Finally, states may simply wait to ratify, perhaps mutually deterring 
one anotherís ratification.60  As one commentator complained shortly before 
the International Law Commission began its codification efforts, 
[n]owadays a general practice most harmful to the international relations is the 
indefinite postponement of ratification by states instead of actual repudiation 
of a treaty.  In political agreements, this policy, the so-called ìwatchful 
waiting,î is not infrequently applied.  Each state waits for the other oneís 
ratification before approving the convention.  This practice of indefinite 
postponement is largely due to the example of the United States. . . .  [N]o less 
than 288 treaties submitted to the American Senate for ratification during the 
period 1789-1931 remained unratified until October, 1942.  The American 
Government has always favored the conclusion of treaties to be ratified ìas 
soon as possible,î so that the Senateís traditional policy of indefinite 
 
else to the ledge and cheering them as they jumped off, but remaining behind to pick and 
choose what it liked or didnít like.î  The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties: The 
Consequences of Participation and Nonparticipation, 78 AM. SOCíY INTíL PROC. 270, 282 
(1984) [hereinafter The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties] (remarks by Frederick S. 
Tipson).  There is no ledge, in the ordinary sense, as other signatories have not taken any 
irreversible step; as explained below, however, it may be more difficult for those who have 
ratified to retrace their steps.  See infra text accompanying notes 111-12. 
Perhaps contemplating this type of problem, the Vienna Convention provides as a 
default rule that a treaty, multilateral or otherwise, will be presumed to come into force ìas 
soon as consent to be bound by the treaty has been established for all the negotiating States.î  
Vienna Convention, supra note 7, art. 24(2).  But it is common, instead, for treaties to come 
into force earlier, upon the consent of a certain number of signatories.  See, e.g., id. art. 84(1) 
(ìThe present Convention shall enter into force on the thirtieth day following the date of 
deposit of the thirty-fifth instrument of ratification or accession.î). 
59. See generally Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Omri Ben-Shahar, Precontractual Reliance, 
30 J. LEGAL STUD. 423 (2001); Richard Craswell, Offer, Acceptance, and Efficient Reliance, 
48 STAN. L. REV. 481 (1996); Avery W. Katz, Contract Formation and Interpretation, in 1 
THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 425, 427-29 (Peter Newman 
ed., 1998); Avery W. Katz, When Should an Offer Stick? The Economics of Promissory 
Estoppel in Preliminary Negotiations, 105 YALE L.J. 1249 (1996). 
60. See, e.g., ANTHONY AUST, MODERN TREATY LAW AND PRACTICE 83 (2d ed. 2000) 
(noting continuing problem of delayed ratification). 
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postponement could have full scope to reject conventions which did not 
further the interests of the Nation, without recourse to the outright refusal, to 
which public opinion is inclined to be somewhat hostile.61 
The end result is that otherwise efficient reliance expendituresóthose that 
may improve the potential for cooperationówill be placed at risk.  A 
conventional solution is to ìrewardî reliance by more readily implying the 
existence of a binding agreement.62  Such an approach has a number of 
drawbacksóit tends to deter the initiation of discussions, for exampleóand 
has in any event already been decisively rejected in the treaty context.63 
A second solution is to impose liability on those inducing relianceóeither 
measured by the degree of reasonable or efficient reliance,64 by strict liability 
for the least-cost avoider (i.e., the more powerful bargaining party),65 or by 
some other intermediate rule.66  This solution, too, seems to have been rejected 
in the treaty context,67 perhaps because the traditional liability inquiries are not 
easily adapted to treaties.68  As a practical matter, too, the international legal 
 
61. CAMARA, supra note 22, at 34-35.  A contemporary opined: 
In recent years, one of the most formidable checks to speedy ratificationónoted particularly 
in connection with conventions dealing with economic mattersóhas been the fear of 
ratifying governments that they would be placed at a temporary disadvantage in relation to 
neighbouring or competing states not yet parties to the convention.  Each state hesitates to 
make the first move.  Rather it prefers to wait and see what step its neighbours will take. 
WILCOX, supra note 22, at 115; accord HOLLOWAY, supra note 23, at 47 & n.29 (noting 
persistence of problem). 
Given concerns about this strategy, commentators who cite the number of treaties 
actually declined by the Senateóparticularly as a means of rebutting the Senateís reputation 
as the ìgraveyard of treatiesîóare arguably missing the point.  See, e.g., David A. Koplow, 
Constitutional Bait and Switch: Executive Reinterpretation of Arms Control Treaties, 137 U. 
PA. L. REV. 1353, 1394 & n.176 (1989).  The problem persists, instead, if the Senate is 
merely ìa place for cold storage.î  Louis Henkin, Treaties in a Constitutional Democracy, 
10 MICH. J. INTíL L. 406, 411 (1989).  Of course, even were the Senate more efficient, see 
CONG. RESEARCH SERV., STUDY FOR THE SENATE COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, TREATIES 
AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS: THE ROLE OF THE UNITED STATES SENATE, S. REP. 
NO. 106-71, at 117-18 (2001) [hereinafter ROLE OF THE SENATE] (asserting that ì[f]ew 
treaties languish indefinitely or are returned to the President without approval, and even 
fewer are defeated outright by vote of the Senateî); Charles I. Bevans, Contemporary 
Practice of the United States Relating to International Law, 62 AM. J. INTíL L. 149, 162-63 
(1968) (tabulating Senate record between 1789 and 1967), one would have to include treaties 
not submitted to the Senate for consideration, or held afterwards without ratification by the 
President. 
62. Cf. Craswell, supra note 59, at 507-43 (describing willingness of courts to find 
offer and acceptance, as well as estoppel, in order to redeem reliance). 
63. See supra text accompanying notes 28-37 (describing failure of efforts to imply 
duty to ratify from signature). 
64. See Craswell, supra note 59. 
65. See Katz, Contract Formation and Interpretation, supra note 59, at 428-29. 
66. See Bebchuk & Ben-Shahar, supra note 59. 
67. See supra text accompanying note 47. 
68. Reliance will be hard to verify.  Even where the aggrieved party has ratified a 
treaty, it may have done so to serve independent national interests, or perhaps (in a 
multilateral treaty) in contemplation of a range of other ratifying probabilities.  Reliance will 
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system is ill suited to provide the right remedies.  While states are supposed to 
pay for their international delicts,69 international law lacks the kind of efficient, 
effective arbiters available for private contractual disputes.70 
Notwithstanding these formal barriers, it remains possible that the same 
result could be achieved by other means.  Lawyers tend to overstate the 
significance of formal sanctions at the expense of other means by which 
international norms may be enforced.71  States have, in fact, a substantial 
incentive to internalize the sort of rules that they ought to:  Unsigning with 
abandon, or exploitatively, would cause their reputations to suffer, leading 
fewer nations to trust them as signatories (and likely impugning, in the bargain, 
their more general reputations for honoring commitments).  The same 
incentives obtain even in the divided-power systems that encouraged the rise of 
ratification and the devaluation of signature:  Legislatures will be inclined to 
approve treaties negotiated by their nationsí executives not only because their 
prior mandate has been sought (and complied with), but also because they 
 
also be impossible to monetize.  Finally, an analysis of relative bargaining power would go 
down a path already rejected as a basis for overturning treaty commitments.  In combination, 
these features suggest that a liability regime for treaties would fail to create sufficient 
incentives for reliance expenditures.  It is also possible to err by creating too much liability, 
which might adversely affect the exchange of information and impair the ìcourtshipî 
between states toward a treaty commitment.  See Jason Scott Johnston, Communication and 
Courtship: Cheap Talk Economics and the Law of Contract Formation, 85 VA. L. REV. 385, 
430-33 (1999).  But for the reasons just discussed, excessive liability, in the strictly legal 
sense, is implausible in this context. 
69. See Draft Articles on State Responsibility: Titles and Texts of the Draft Articles on 
Responsibility of States for Intentionally Wrongful Acts Adopted by the Drafting Committee 
on Second Reading, art. 31, U.N. GAOR, Intíl L. Commín, 53d Sess., Supp. No. 10, at 4, 
U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/L.602/Rev.1 (2001) (providing that ì[t]he responsible State is under an 
obligation to make full reparation for the injury caused by the internationally wrongful act,î 
and that ì[i]njury includes any damage, whether material or moral, caused by the 
internationally wrongful act of a Stateî); e.g., Chorzow Factory (Ger. v. Pol.), 1927 P.C.I.J. 
(ser. A) No.9, at 21 (July 26) (ìIt is a principle of international law that the breach of an 
engagement involves an obligation to make reparation in an adequate form.  Reparation 
therefore is the indispensable complement of a failure to apply a convention and there is no 
necessity for this to be stated in the convention itself.î). 
70. Though international compensation schemes have flourished, they remain 
exceptional in character, and rely ultimately on compliance that is essentially voluntary in 
character.  Cf. Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. 580, 598 (1884) (noting that, while a treaty may 
provide for individual redress, it ìdepends for the enforcement of its provisions on the 
interest and the honor of the governments which are parties to it.  If these fail, its infraction 
becomes the subject of international negotiations and reclamations, so far as the injured party 
chooses to seek redress, which may in the end be enforced by actual war.  It is obvious that 
with all this the judicial courts have nothing to do and can give no redress.î). 
71. George W. Downs, Enforcement and the Evolution of Cooperation, 19 MICH. J. 
INTíL L. 319, 321-22 (1998) (describing differing perspectives of political economists and 
international lawyers with respect to enforcement mechanisms). 
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desire to maintain the nationís reputation for the sake of future commitments.72  
If this is plausible, perhaps the notion that states should heed their signatures is 
less a matter of customary international law (as even the Vienna Convention 
assumed) than the result of sheer self-interest,73 and the unsigning of the Rome 
Statute was simply aberrational. 
Self-interest of this kind may well explain the novelty of the ICC episode 
and establish a safeguard of continuing importance, but it is unlikely to be a 
complete solution.  States might be independently motivated to impose 
intermediate obligations on themselves, perhaps not unlike those described by 
article 18 of the Vienna Convention, as a means of demonstrating that they are 
credible partners (and, in divided-power systems, as a way of according the 
agent some but not too much binding authority).  But reputation is a complex 
construct,74 and its disciplining function surely depends in part on the existence 
and clarity of rules permitting or prohibiting the conduct in question.75  It is 
worth examining, accordingly, how well the interim obligationóthe only 
means by which the Vienna Convention addresses mere signatories, and an 
exemplar of the kind of rules states might otherwise constructóperforms. 
B.   The (In)Adequacy of Interim Obligations 
Article 18 was developed, as has been recounted, more for formalistic 
reasonsóas a means of preserving the legal significance of the signatureóthan 
as a remedy for the particular ex post and ex ante effects just described.  Yet it 
is nonetheless possible to rationalize the interim obligation as being an answer 
of sorts:  By reducing the difference between nonratification and ratification, 
the interim obligation reduces the risk of exploitation.  If signatories are 
 
72. Even with differing preferences, a nationís legislature and its executives profit 
from the ability to make this kind of commitment.  See LISA L. MARTIN, DEMOCRATIC 
COMMITMENTS: LEGISLATURES AND INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION 39-41 (2000). 
73. Professors Goldsmith and Posner have been vigorous about insisting on this 
distinction.  See Jack L. Goldsmith & Eric A. Posner, A Theory of Customary International 
Law, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 1113 (1999).  Contra, e.g., Edward T. Swaine, Rational Custom, 52 
DUKE L.J. 559 (2002) (arguing that the distinction between obligations under customary 
international law and self-interest is overstated). 
74. Compare, e.g., Goldsmith & Posner, supra note 73, at 1135 (noting generally that a 
ìreputation for compliance with international law is not necessarily the best meansóand 
certainly not the only meansófor accomplishing foreign policy objectivesî), and Jack 
Goldsmith, Sovereignty, International Relations Theory, and International Law, 52 STAN. L. 
REV. 959, 985 (2000) (book review) (suggesting that the value of establishing a reputation 
for obeying international law is exaggerated as a diplomatic tool), with Swaine, Rational 
Custom, supra note 73 (relying on reputation for legal obedience in defending consistency of 
international law theory with rational choice models). 
75. See, e.g., James D. Morrow, The Laws of War, Common Conjectures, and Legal 
Systems in International Politics, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. S41, S43 (observing that ì[r]eciprocal 
enforcement depends on a shared understanding of what conduct is unacceptable and what 
consequences follow from such conductî). 
SWAINE 6/1/2003  12:35 PM 
2078 STANFORD LAW REVIEW [Vol. 55:2061 
encumbered by duties that meaningfully approximate those imposed on parties, 
their incentives to defect from ratificationóthat is, to seek out or to maintain 
status as a mere signatoryómay be diminished. 
Having said that, there are evident problems with attributing such a 
function to article 18.  For one, the interim obligationís substantive scope is 
probably not well tailored to this purpose.  The Vienna Convention does not 
suggest any easily administered test for determining a treatyís ìobject and 
purposeî or, for that matter, for assessing when a stateís actions would ìdefeatî 
it,76 and there is little in the way of clarifying practice.77  Some commentators 
regard compliance with article 18 as turning on the observance of major or 
indispensable treaty provisions, an approach relatively well suited to the above-
described functional approach.78  But the interim obligation is more commonly 
understood to safeguard against acts that would disable the mere signatory (or 
others) from complying with the treaty once it entered into forceóin an attempt 
to maintain, as relevant, the status quo ante.79  If interim obligations are so 
limited, they can only correspond imperfectly with any goal of reducing the gap 
between mere signatories and ratifiers.  The interim obligation does not, in any 
 
76. See, e.g., AUST, supra note 60, at 94 (noting uncertain nature of obligationís 
extent); Charme, supra note 39, at 74 (finding article 18 ìvague and amorphous,î and 
lacking ìinherent value,î but somehow virtuous); McDade, supra note 44, at 45-47 (noting 
lack of clarity in interim obligation); Rogoff, supra note 44, at 297 (noting that ì[t]he 
content of the obligation as it emerges from application by international tribunals is 
extremely uncertain and there are few interpretational guidesî). 
77. See AUST, supra note 60, at 94 (noting that there ìis virtually no practice in the 
application of the provisionî). 
78. See, e.g., McDade, supra note 44, at 42.  Such an approach is consistent with that 
taken to reservations.  See infra text accompanying note 85 (discussing opinion of the 
Human Rights Committee). 
79. Anthony Aust, for example, stressed that a state that has not ratified is not under a 
duty to comply with the treaty, nor to refrain from acts inconsistent with its provisions, but 
instead need only avoid ìanything which would affect its ability fully to comply with the 
treaty once it has entered into force.î  AUST, supra note 60, at 94; see also RESTATEMENT 
(THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 49, ß 312 cmt. i; Klabbers, supra note 46, at 
293-94 (rejecting provision-centered approach as inconsistent with the organic focus of 
article 18, and approaching making signature the equivalent of ratification); Rogoff, supra 
note 44, at 297 (stressing that ìthe obligation in its present form imposes no affirmative duty 
upon a signatory to do certain acts or to carry out specific provisions of the treatyî); id. at 
298-99 (concluding that ìthe purpose of the rule is to prevent a signatory from claiming the 
benefits to which it is entitled under the treaty while at the same time engaging in acts that 
would materially reduce the benefits to which the other signatory or signatories are 
entitledî). 
The argument in favor of this lesser obligation is often based on limits in the customary 
precedent, or first principles.  But it also appears consistent with the Vienna Conventionís 
distinction of a treatyís ìprovisional application,î which parties-to-be are required to observe 
only when they have so agreed.  See Vienna Convention, supra note 7, art. 25(1) (providing 
that ì[a] treaty or a part of a treaty is applied provisionally pending its entry into force if:  (a) 
the treaty itself so provides; or (b) the negotiating States have in some other manner so 
agreedî). 
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event, attempt to establish a degree of interim responsibility proportionate to 
the risk of defection and its costs. 
Nor, for that matter, does the Vienna Conventionís formal reach inspire 
confidence.  The Convention applies only to treaties concluded by states after 
the Convention has entered into force with respect to them.80  There is some 
dispute as to whether article 18 codifies customary international law that would 
independently bind nonparties;81 given the ambiguity in article 18, it is 
unsurprising that the answers vary, and perhaps meaningfully.  For example, 
the United Statesówhich, coincidentally enough, has signed but not ratified the 
Vienna Conventionóhas represented that it regards article 18 as reflecting 
customary international law.82  Its acknowledgements have been opaque, 
however, as to how it understands the interim obligation, and it remains free to 
claim that it follows customary international law, and even article 18, without 
acquiescing in a state partyís interpretation of what the interim obligation 
requires. 
Finally, the interim obligation is also not easily enforced.  Neither the 
Vienna Convention nor customary international law creates any institutional 
mechanism for policing such obligations.  Given that a minority of states 
acquiesce in the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice,83 
 
80. Vienna Convention, supra note 7, art. 4.  For fuller consideration, see E.W. 
Vierdag, The Law Governing Treaty Relations Between Parties to the Vienna Convention on 
the Law of Treaties and States Not Party to the Convention, 76 AM. J. INTíL L. 779 (1982).  
This has a potentially substantial impact on the Vienna Conventionís application.  See The 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 58, at 282 (remarks by Maria 
Frankowska) (estimating, based primarily on data from 1979, that less than half of the major 
treatymaking states (as of 1984) were parties to the Vienna Convention, 70% of the treaty 
activity of Vienna Convention parties was conducted with nonparties, and only 10% of 
bilateral treaties were covered).  The number of parties to the Vienna Convention has 
increased considerably, of course, but the point remains that gaps in the Conventionís 
coverage reduce its application geometrically. 
81. See AUST, supra note 60, at 94 (noting uncertainty); GLENNON, supra note 19, at 
171-72 (noting controversy, but concluding that the better view is that the Convention 
reflects customary international law ìas it existed at the time the Vienna Convention was 
adoptedî); SHABTAI ROSENNE, DEVELOPMENTS IN THE LAW OF TREATIES, 1945-1986, at 149 
(noting that article 18 is ìhighly controversialî due to its perceived departure from 
customary international law, and was not included among the articles for discussion in 
connection with the 1986 Vienna Conference on the treaties of international organizations); 
SINCLAIR, supra note 51, at 22, 38-40 (noting controversy, and opining that article 18 at least 
represented a ìprogressive developmentî in customary international law). 
82. Robert E. Dalton, The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties: Consequences 
for the United States, 78 AM. SOCíY INTíL PROC. 276, 278 (1984) (citing representations by 
Secretary of State William P. Rogers in 1971 and Ambassador Elliot Richardson in 1979); 
see also GLENNON, supra note 19, at 172 & n.54 (citing representation by Secretary of State 
John Hay). 
83. For a collection of current declarations, see Intíl Court of Justice, Declarations 
Recognizing as Compulsory the Jurisdiction of the Court, at http://www.icj-
cij.org/icjwww/ibasicdocuments/ibasictext/ibasicdeclarations.htm (last visited Mar. 13, 
2003). 
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the only formal dispute resolution process available in most cases is due to the 
particular treaty in questionóto which a mere signatory is not, by definition, a 
party.  Where an institution has been made competent to resolve similar 
questions, the results have not been inspiring.  The International Court of 
Justice, addressing the subject of reservations to the Genocide Convention, 
emphasized in a vague way the obligations of a signatory, but acknowledged 
that they ìnecessarily var[y] in individual cases.î84  More recently, the Human 
Rights Committee took a broad, and arguably ad hoc, view of the kind of 
reservations that would be incompatible with the ìobject and purposeî of the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, a question prompted by 
article 19 of the Vienna Convention.85  Its inquiry, however, prompted some 
state parties to object both to the Committeeís substantive conclusions and to 
its assertion of authority to resolve the matteróat the evident expense of the 
role for state objections.86 
Arguably the strongest evidence of the interim obligationís inadequacy lies 
in state practice.  To be sure, a mere signatoryís failure to comport with a treaty 
may engender protests,87 and some states have appeared willing to comply with 
a treaty notwithstanding the lack of ratification.88  But it is easy to explain such 
 
84. Advisory Opinion No. 12, Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and 
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 1951 I.C.J. 15, 28 (May 28) [hereinafter Advisory 
Opinion on Reservations to the Genocide Convention]. 
85. Covenant on Civil and Political Rights General Comment 24: Issues Relating to 
Reservations Made Upon Ratification or Accession to the Covenant or the Optional 
Protocols Thereto, or in Relation to Declarations Under Article 41 of the Covenant, U.N. 
GAOR, Hum. Rts. Comm., 52d Sess., U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.6 (1994). 
86. See, e.g., Observations by the United States of America on General Comment No. 
24 (52), U.N. Doc. A/50/40, vol. 1, annex VI, at 126-27 (1996). 
87. See Klabbers, supra note 46, at 284-85 (citing example of criticisms by activists of 
Angolaís decision to use landmines after signing the Anti-Landmine Convention).  
Academics, indeed, are adept at detecting circumstances in which the interim obligation may 
be invoked against dilatory ratifiers like the United States.  See, e.g., Michael McDonnell, 
Cluster Bombs over Kosovo: A Violation of International Law?, 44 ARIZ. L. REV. 31, 107 
(2002) (claiming that the use by the United States of an indiscriminate weapon would violate 
its duties as a signatory of the First Protocol). 
88. Thus, in the absence of Senate consent to Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) 
II, President Reagan indicated that the United States would ìrefrain from actions which 
undercut [existing agreements] so long as the Soviet Union shows equal restraint,î but the 
terms of his representation seemed to turn more on how the United States perceived its 
interests rather than on the existence of any obligation imposed by international law.  
GLENNON, supra note 19, at 169. 
In the Clinton Administration, Secretary of State Albright informed foreign 
governments that ìthe United States is legally bound to observe the nuclear test-ban treaty, 
despite the Senateís rejection of the pact.î  Scott, supra note 15, at 1448 (citations omitted).  
As noted above, the position that article 18 entails a duty to observe the treaty proper is a 
minority view, and the State Department later clarified that the interim obligation did not 
require such fidelity: 
[T]here is a misunderstanding that needs to be clarified.  The president is not claiming that 
the United States is bound by the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.  We cannot be bound by a 
treaty that has not been ratified and that is not in force. 
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behavior as serving political objectives independent of the interim obligation.  
States have not in general behaved as though the interim obligation imposes a 
burden.  The strongest evidence of salience are cases in which states considered 
interim obligations as one reason among many for failing to sign a treaty, 
though even there concern about interim obligations is difficult to distinguish 
from less-transient substantive objections.89 
The evidence contraindicating the efficacy of interim obligations seems 
more persuasive.  The number of instances in which states are mere signatories 
has remained high, and in many cases such instances have persisted for a 
prolonged period without significant legal controversy.  It is somewhat 
surprising, if the interim obligation had teeth, for such situations to have 
persistedóat least for treaties like the Genocide Convention, in which a 
signatory might have substantial concern about being called to account.  One 
might expect, at the very least, that states would have been involved in more 
conflicts concerning the scope of their interim obligations, and that more 
allegations of breach would have been airedóunless the rules were clear, 
which they are not. 
Even the recent controversy involving the ICC, which brought the issue of 
interim obligations to the fore, demonstrates their inadequacy.  The evidence 
regarding article 18ís influence on U.S. behavior prior to unsigning is at least 
mixed.  On the one hand, the United Statesís decision to sign the Rome Statute, 
 
[W]hat we are saying is that as a signatory, there is an understanding in the international 
community that if youíre a signatory and you intend to seek ratification later, that you not 
take steps to defeat the object and purpose of the treaty.  That is the legal term of art.  . . . 
[W]e are going to seek a second chance to get approval for the Comprehensive Test Ban. 
And in the meantime, the president is going to continue pursuing the policy that has been in 
effect since 1992; that is, not to conduct any nuclear explosions. 
And let me be clear.  As a signatory that has not ratified the treaty, the point is that weíre 
not obligated to abide by every term and provision of an elaborate treaty document; but with 
respect to the basic object and purpose of the treaty not to test nuclear explosions, that is the 
basic object and purpose. 
U.S. State Dept. Briefing, FED. NEWS SERVICE, Nov. 5, 1999 (remarks of Jamie Rubin).  
Notwithstanding the clarification, the overall impression was that the President was 
essentially electing the degree of obligation as a matter of national policy. 
89. In considering the Law of the Sea Convention, for example, the United Kingdom 
reportedly considered the interim obligation as a factor counseling against signature, though 
it ultimately decided to decline for unrelated reasons.  See SINCLAIR, supra note 51, at 274.  
The United States, too, had substantive concerns with respect to the interim obligation, 
though it in fact decided to sign the Convention.  See The Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties, supra note 58, at 284 (remarks by Frederick S. Tipson).  Just to confuse matters 
further, after the Convention went into force the United Kingdom elected to become a party 
and the United States, as yet, has not.  United Nations, Department of Oceans and the Law of 
the Sea, Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea, Chronological Lists of 
Ratifications of, Accessions and Successions to the Convention and the Related Agreements 
as at [sic] 12 November 2001, at http://www.un.org/Depts/los/reference_files/ 
chronological_lists_of_ratifications.htm (updated Dec. 10, 2002).  For a brief summary of 
U.S. policy, see Marjorie Anne Brown, The Law of the Sea Convention and U.S. Policy 
(Feb. 14, 2001) (Cong. Research Serv. Issue Brief 95010), available at 
http://www.ncseonline.org/NLE/CRSreports/Marine/mar-16.cfm. 
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while having little expectation of ratifying it as such, seems facially 
inconsistent with an understanding that it thereby assumed a burdensome 
obligation.90  On the other hand, in withdrawing its signature, U.S. officials did 
alludeóat least as a secondary matteróto the virtue of avoiding interim 
obligations.91  Although it is hard to disentangle the Bush Administrationís 
motivations, its domestic and international stance against the ICCóalong with 
concerted opposition in the Senateówere probably sufficient reasons, 
independent of its interim obligations, to warrant unsigning.  The need to 
maintain a consistent message was made all the more acute by the U.S. agenda 
of pursuing so-called article 98(2) bilateral agreements to further ensure the 
exemption of U.S. personnel from ICC jurisdiction, an agenda arguably 
inconsistent with any attempt to maintain that the Rome Statute was 
workable.92 
Whatever its motivation, the fact of unsigning provides the keenest lesson.  
Article 18, as noted previously, does not require that the interim obligation be 
observed for all eternity, but instead only ìuntil [the signatory] shall have made 
its intention clear not to become a party to the treaty.î93  There is no guidance 
on how this intention may be made manifest,94 and while it may be absurd to 
contend that violating a treatyís object and purpose itself constitutes an 
adequate signal of that intention,95 there is no reason to believe that the 
procedure is particularly burdensome.96  The bottom line, in any case, is that if 
 
90. This was also evident in some of the remarks by Secretary of State-nominee Colin 
Powell, reflected in Wedgwood, supra note 24, at 195-96. 
91. Thus Ambassador Prosper, responding to a query as to why the United States 
unsigned the treaty rather than simply failing to ratify, cited the interim obligation, indicating 
that the United States 
to maintain our flexibilityónot only to protect our interests but to pursue alternative judicial 
mechanismsódecided to make clear that we will not be part of this treaty and thus be able to 
take different approaches that may be different to the object and purpose [of] the ICC treaty. 
Prosper, supra note 1.  The interim obligation was not, however, cited in the notification by 
Under Secretary of State Bolton, supra note 1, nor in the remarks by Secretary Rumsfeld, 
supra note 1, nor by Under Secretary of State Grossman, supra note 1. 
92. See Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 98(2).  But see Scheffer, supra note 9, at 59 
(arguing that U.S. signature was intended to enhance the ease of securing article 98(2) 
agreements). 
93. Vienna Convention, supra note 7, art. 18(a). 
94. The procedure appears to have had no precedent in customary international law. 
See McDade, supra note 44, at 23-24. 
95. But see United Nations Conference on the Law of Treaties, Documents of the 
Conference, 1st & 2d Sess., at 100, U.N. Doc. A/Conf./39/11/Add.2 (1968-1969) (reporting 
statement by French delegate that ìthe most obvious way for a State to make clear its 
intention not to become a party to the treaty was for it to frustrate the object of the treatyî). 
96. A more legitimate question concerns whether the refusal to submit a treaty for 
legislative consent, or the legislatureís rejection of a treaty, constitutes a sufficient signal in 
the absence of a more formal notice of the kind provided with respect to the Rome Statute.  
See, e.g., Mayaguezanos por la Salud y el Ambiente v. United States, 38 F. Supp. 2d 168, 
175 n.3 (D.P.R.) (asserting interim obligation to adhere to the ìpurposes and principlesî of 
the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea based on presidential signature, at 
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a signatory feels burdened by the interim obligation, and contemplates taking 
acts that might be viewed as violating a treatyís object and purpose, it can 
quickly disengage itself.  This ease of exit greatly limits the potential force of 
the interim obligation.  Now that unsigning has been deployed, states interested 
in pressing mere signatories into compliance must weigh the possibility that 
their actions will widen the gap between ratification and nonratification by 
driving signatories to unsign. 
This kind of complete exitóas opposed to the failure of signatories to 
progress toward ratificationómay have been the most upsetting to international 
expectations.  The practice of letting signed treaties linger, without ratifying or 
unsigning them, seems to have created an expectation that the treaty process 
was a one-way ratchet:  A mere signatoryís hesitance might mean that its 
participation in a treaty would not (at least for a time) be fully realized, but 
once it had signed, it would not, and could not, turn its back on the matter.97  
Such an understanding would, in theory, help ease the transition from signature 
to ratification, and ensure consistency with the priority on securing even 
imperfect adherence to multilateral treatiesóa point emphasized by the 
International Court of Justiceís tolerance for state reservations and, notably, its 
characterization of signature as ìa first step toward ratification.î98  This vision 
is, of course, strictly inconsistent with article 18ís apparent tolerance for exit, 
and contemplating that possibility makes the potentially perverse effects of 
interim obligations immediately evident. 
C.   Implications 
The resulting predicament adds a novel twist to the conventional account 
concerning the enforcement of international obligations.  Vague standards like 
the interim obligation, it is thought, may be intentionally selectedónot 
incidentally, because they permit negotiators to achieve agreement where it 
 
least ìpending ratification or rejection by the Senateî), affíd on other grounds, 198 F.3d 297 
(1st Cir. 1999).  Though a full exploration of these questions is beyond the scope of this 
Article, it is enough to note their practical implications.  Were rejection by the U.S. Senate 
enough, for example, some might argue that a re-signing by the President would reinstate the 
interim obligation, at least assuming that were permissible under the relevant treaty.  See 
Garrett Epps, Restarting the CTBT, NATION, May 15, 2000, at 5 (urging just such a course 
with respect to the CTBT).  Such a rule would also be inconsistent with U.S. domestic 
practice, under which the Senate ordinarily remains seized of a treaty even after having 
rejected itóand on at least one occasion, reconsidered the treaty and approved it just days 
after having initially rejected it.  See ROLE OF THE SENATE, supra note 61, at 8, 12, 144-45. 
97. This line of thought is implicit in some of the commentary on the United Statesís 
initial signing, as well as its unsigning, of the Rome Statute.  See, e.g., Charlesworth, supra 
note 56, at 11 (asserting that since ì[e]ven signing a treaty imposes a general obligation not 
to act in a way that is contrary to the object and purpose of the treaty . . . the US is 
committed to the creation of an independent and impartial International Criminal Courtî). 
98. Advisory Opinion on Reservations to the Genocide Convention, supra note 84, at 
28. 
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would not otherwise be possible.99  By the same token, however, they are less 
likely to prove adequate in any deeper efforts at cooperation, which create 
greater incentives to defect.100 
The Rome Statute illustrates this tension in treaty formulation even in the 
processes of treaty formation, and suggests the difficulties of achieving a 
universal solution by tinkering with the interim obligation.  The potential 
upside to strengthening mere signatoriesí obligations, to be sure, is obvious 
enough.  Because the ICC imposed potentially significant costs on signatories, 
the risk of cheatingóeven on lesser, interim obligations, to the extent they 
retain meaningócannot be discounted.  The reputational cost of such cheating, 
moreover, would be low if there were no clear, shared understanding of what 
constituted a violation.  Finally, more defined or more easily enforced interim 
obligations might be desirable as a means of reducing the strategic advantage 
that mere signatories retain over state parties, and thus encouraging complete 
subscription. 
Any resulting attrition among signatories, it may also be argued, is not 
invariably a bad thing.  Strengthening obligations helps to identify states that 
may be unwilling to abide by a treaty, and to that extent causes precisely the 
right states to drop out.101  But such a depiction may also be overly static.  
Mere signatories may be undergoing a process of adjustment and adaptation, 
either internationally (through norm internalization, for example, or by 
negotiating changes in the treatyís terms) or domestically (by selling the treaty 
to domestic audiences), and may legitimately be uncertain as to how either 
process will pan outórather than being, say, uncertain as to whether or not 
they would choose to comply should they ratify. 
States may also, at least on occasion, be less concerned with imposing and 
enforcing equivalent obligations than with increasing the sum of compliance 
with a set of norms.  The Rome Statute is part of a modern wave of treaties 
oriented toward universal participation,102 and it is well understood that such 
 
99. See, e.g., Downs, supra note 71, at 330 (observing that to political economists, ìit 
is often a sensible strategy to claim ambiguity as a cover for noncompliance,î and ì[t]hey 
also suspect that ambiguity is often built into the agreement intentionally as a device that 
negotiators can use strategically to reap the political benefits of reaching an agreement when 
one might otherwise not be achievedî); id. at 343 (observing that ìambiguity in treaty 
language and claims of incapacity are often instrumentally useful for States,î whichó
ì[w]ithin certain boundsîómay ìdeliberately choose how ambiguous to make treaties and 
how much oversight capacity they will employ in connection with a given agreementî). 
100. George W. Downs, David M. Roche & Peter N. Barsoom, Is the Good News 
About Compliance Good News About Cooperation?, 50 INTíL ORG. 379, 380, 384-87 (1996). 
101. See Morrow, supra note 75, at S48-50, S57-58. 
102. See Phillipe Kirsch, The International Criminal Court, 46 MCGILL L.J. 255, 259 
(2000) (accounting, by Chairman of the Preparatory Committee for the Establishment of the 
International Criminal Court, of the tension between ìa strong statute and strong support 
from the international community,î with emphasis on the desire for ìwidespread signature 
and ratificationî and the goal of achieving ìsupport that is as universal as possibleî); cf. Jose 
E. Alvarez, The New Treaty Makers, 25 B.C. INTíL & COMP. L. REV. 213, 220-21 (2002) 
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an objective entails greater flexibility as to substantive standards and 
noncompliance.103  If the goal of background treaty rules is to encourage states 
to make reliance investments in their desired regimes, it is important to ensure 
that those rules are not unduly biased against investments in breadth rather than 
depth of cooperation. 
III.  STRATEGIC SOLUTIONS 
Understanding the range of variables involved suggests that the most 
promising solutions to the problem of unsigning may be treaty-specific or, at 
most, take the form of default rules.  But for the reasons just discussed, it may 
be difficult to establish any clearer, universal set of expectations for mere 
signatoriesóand hazardous, to the extent it generalizes about the relative 
virtues of treaty breadth and depth.  Even with respect to individual treaties, 
negotiators may find it difficult enough to find common ground with respect to 
partiesí ultimate obligations, and have little tasteóand, if ambiguity is thought 
advantageous, little genuine desireófor trying to resolve which treaty 
obligations are paramount for mere signatories. 
Another set of strategies would try to reduce the incidence of mere 
signature.  One such option involves establishing a deadline for signature, 
beyond which states desiring to participate in a treaty regime must accede 
completely, domestic ratification and all.104  Narrowing the window of 
opportunity for signature necessarily reduces the ease of state entry, and may 
thus impose costs in terms of breadth of participation.  The experience with this 
mechanism under the Rome Statute, moreover, suggests that it may simply 
encourage hasty signaturesóPresident Clintonís signature was not only in the 
ìtwilight of his Administration,î but also on the ìlast possible day for a 
 
(describing Rome Statute as exemplary of broad-based treatymaking in organizations 
ìaspiring to universal or nearly univeral membershipî). 
103. Advisory Opinion on Reservations to the Genocide Convention, supra note 84, at 
21-22 (concluding that the ìvery wide degree of participation envisagedî by the Genocide 
Convention, and the reliance on majority voting in determining its provisions, called for 
ìflexibilityî in establishing rules for its operation); id. at 23 (characterizing Convention as 
pursuing the ìcommon interest,î such that the ìindividual advantages or disadvantages to 
States,î and ìthe maintenance of a perfect contractual balance between rights and duties,î 
are substantially irrelevant).  The same approach may be evidenced by the treatment of 
virtual reservations to the Rome Statute.  See supra note 24. 
104. The Vienna Convention itself leaves the choice of ratification, accession, or other 
means of consent wholly to the negotiating parties.  See Vienna Convention, supra note 7, 
art. 11; see also id. arts. 12-15 (detailing provisions for means of expressing consent, but 
providing for few practical differences).  The relationship between ratification and accession 
has proven arcane, see, e.g., JONES, supra note 25, at 124-32 (discussing controversies), but 
in modern practice the distinction typically arises when a state has missed a deadline for 
signature or otherwise been denied the opportunity to sign.  See AUST, supra note 60, at 88. 
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signature without ratificationî105óand thus increase the likelihood of shallow 
engagement and eventual exit.  A second such option, limiting the rights of 
signatories, focuses less on reducing the initial population of mere signatories 
than on encouraging them to make the transition to party status.  Nonetheless, 
limiting signatoriesí rights is likely to have a direct effect on entry, and even 
ratification, by decreasing the incentive for states to sign.106 
A third possibility would be to limit the time available for ratification by 
signatories.  States may be encouraged to ratify early if doing so is 
prestigious,107 but it seems implausible that prestige alone could serve as the 
basis for additional leverage.  Negotiators may instead create an absolute 
deadline or establish a maximum period between a stateís signature and the 
tendering of its final consent.  Doing either would, in theory, reduce the period 
during which discrepant obligations applied, and encourage signatories to 
progress more rapidly toward ratification.  These options are available under 
the existing law of treaties, but are rarely exploited,108 perhaps largely because 
of the collective interest in maximizing the opportunities for ratification.109  
But there are also practical impediments to limiting opportunities for 
ratification.  On the rare occasions when absolute deadlines have been 
established, as within the League of Nations, they have later been modified in 
order to enhance the treatyís scope, and thus may lack credibility.110  An 
individuated limit may encounter the different problem that, given the 
widespread possibilities for treaty accession, any state finding its signature 
 
105. Wedgwood, supra note 24, at 193; see Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 125(1) 
(providing that ìthe Statute shall remain open for signature in New York, at United Nations 
Headquarters, until 31 December 2000î).  But cf. Scheffer, supra note 9, at 68 (concluding 
that ì[t]he Presidentís decision represented work on the ICC throughout his Administration, 
and thus was anything but a rushed decision at the end of December 2000î). 
106. That tradeoff may not be inevitable, as suggested by the striking example of the 
practice of objecting to reservations:  Mere signatories obtain the right to object, but the 
status of their objections is contingent upon their own ratification.  See Advisory Opinion on 
Reservations to the Genocide Convention, supra note 84, at 28 (ì[W]ithout ratification, 
signature does not make the signatory State a party to the Convention; nevertheless, it 
establishes a provisional status in favour of that State. . . . Pending ratification, the 
provisional status created by signature confers upon the signatory a right to formulate as a 
precautionary measure objections which have themselves a provisional character.  These 
would disappear if the signature were not followed by ratification, or they would become 
effective on ratification.î).  This particular variant is unavailable, of course, where 
reservations are impermissible, as in the case of the Rome Statute. 
107. Cf. AUST, supra note 60, at 81 (speculating that a state may ratify before 
implementing legislation has been enacted ìso that it can say that it has been one of the first 
to ratify, and thereby gain kudos at home and abroadî). 
108. See, e.g., AUST, supra note 60, at 83 (noting that ì[i]t is not usual to set a deadline 
for ratificationî); ARNOLD DUNCAN MCNAIR, THE LAW OF TREATIES 88 (1938). 
109. See, e.g., AUST, supra note 60, at 81. 
110. See JONES, supra note 25, at 86 n.2; WILCOX, supra note 22, at 143-44 (describing 
experience of the League of Nations with the Conference on the Exportation of Hides, Skin, 
and Bones). 
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lapsed may simply re-sign.  Establishing any more general principle, like 
desuetude for signature, would likely run into similar obstacles. 
Using interim obligations to approximate partiesí obligations, or otherwise 
attempting to encourage ratification, seems for these reasons to be of limited 
value in answering the unsigning problem.  A more promising avenue, in my 
view, is instead to reduce somewhat the advantages that mere signatories have 
with respect to exit.  Treaty parties generally retain, of course, the opportunity 
to withdraw from their obligations.111  Where such a right exists, but no 
conditions are stipulated, the Vienna Convention provides that no less than 
twelve monthsí notice is required.112  The result, as noted earlier, is that a mere 
signatory can exit more expeditiously than can a party with more substantial 
and well-defined obligations. 
It seems wholly reasonable, and feasible, to extend the partiesí regimen to 
mere signatories:  Where a signatory wishes to provide notice of its intention 
not to ratify under article 18, that noticeís effect would be delayed for twelve 
months, or for whatever period provided for party withdrawal under the 
particular treaty.  The notion is not entirely unprecedented.  Uncertain as to the 
continuing force of the ABM Treaty after the Soviet Unionís dissolution, the 
Clinton Administration negotiated and signed a Memorandum of 
Understanding (MOU) purporting to extend the treaty to the newly independent 
states, but refrained from submitting the MOU to likely defeat in the Senate.  
The Bush Administration, in turn, faced an ABM Treaty of uncertain 
continuing authority (but which its officials had proclaimed dead upon the 
Soviet Unionís breakup) and an MOU that at most imposed an interim 
obligation under article 18.  Although it had the option, by its lights, of 
disavowing the ABM Treaty and unsigning the MOU with immediate effect, it 
instead elected to comply with the ABM Treatyís original requirements for 
withdrawalówhich entailed notice and a delay in the entry into force.113 
 
111. Under the Vienna Convention, however, the right to withdraw is not universally 
available; if the right is not specifically afforded within a particular treatyís terms, it is 
unavailable unless it can be established that the parties intended to permit withdrawal or such 
a right may be implied by the nature of the treaty.  Vienna Convention, supra note 7, art. 
56(1).  While this may seem to be an undue, if self-imposed, constraint on national 
sovereignty, the inability to withdraw makes perfect sense in the context of treaties, like 
those settling borders, in which permanence is highly prized.  But see Setear, An Iterative 
Perspective, supra note 29, at 208-09 (querying distinction among types of treaties with 
respect to withdrawal or denunciation, while advocating approach biased against withdrawal 
from or denunciation of any type of treaty). 
112. Vienna Convention, supra note 7, art. 56(2). 
113. See supra note 15 (citing withdrawal notices).  The rationale was best laid out by 
Robert Turner, whose testimony before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations stated 
the case for regarding the ABM Treaty as defunct, noted the interim obligation not to betray 
the object and purpose of the MOU, and argued for the discretionary act of notifying 
withdrawal in accord with the ABM Treatyís original terms.  See National Missile Defense 
and the ABM Treaty (Part 2), Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 
107th Cong., 1st Sess. (July 24, 2001) (testimony of Robert F. Turner); Robert F. Turner, 
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The better question may be how such a norm might be more generally 
implemented, given that unsigning states may not always exhibit such largesse.  
The most aggressive approach would be to infer a default requirement of 
unsigning lead-time from the Vienna Convention.  As previously noted, article 
18 does not specify any particular method of providing notice of the intent not 
to become a party to a treaty, and might be amenable to importing a default 
method stipulated elsewhere, such as for withdrawal.  The difficulty, however, 
is that the interim obligation is supposed to last only from the point of signature 
ìuntilî the mere signatory has made its intention clear, which is facially 
inconsistent with the automatic implication of an additional twelve-month 
buffer.114  It may also be argued that unsigning without adequate lead-time is 
itself inconsistent with a treatyís object and purpose, but that argument seems 
to depend overmuch on the minority position as to the provisional, treaty-
mimicking character of the interim obligation.  Any attempt to find a default 
rule within the Vienna Convention, finally, would not only be susceptible to 
telling criticisms as to treaty construction, but would certainly exceed any 
requirement imposed by customary international law, and thus would fail to 
bind nonparties like the United States. 
The surer course would be to incorporate such terms on a treaty-by-treaty 
basis.  Article 18 does not, on its face, permit derogation by the parties to a 
particular treaty, but one may reasonably argue that the greater power of 
permitting parties to make signature determinative of consent includes the 
power to subject signatories to stricter conditions than those imposed by article 
18.  Such an approach would have at least two distinct advantages.  First, while 
the strategic considerations discussed in Part I counsel in favor of limiting the 
advantage mere signatories may have over ratifiers in multilateral treaties, they 
have far less application to bilateral treaties, suggesting that the one-size-fits-all 
approach in article 18 may be inappropriate to the problem of unsigning.  
Second, there is no reason to believe that the balance of considerationsóin 
particular, the fear of deterring would-be signatories through excessive 
restrictions on exit, versus the concern that mere signatories may be in a 
position to exploit ratifiers or even to slow down or halt the treatyís entry into 
forceówill be the same for every kind of treaty.  Indeed, while I have 
suggested that the period for withdrawal may be easily borrowed in order to 
establish the lead time for unsigning, it is by no means obvious that that is the 
right answer for each and every strategic situation. 
 
National Missile Defense and the 1972 ABM Treaty, 36 NEW ENG. L. REV. 807 (2002) 
(reprising testimony). 
114. See Vienna Convention, supra note 7, art. 18. 
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CONCLUSION 
Unsigning, in short, should be acknowledged as a legitimate and 
understandable course of action under the Vienna Convention, albeit one that 
may impair the successful pursuit of multilateral treaties.  If little is asked of 
mere signatories, the risk that unsigning will become endemic is low.  But with 
the continued popularity of multilateral conventions, and the proliferation of 
parties actively engaged in making and enforcing international law, it is 
becoming steadily less likely that states will be able to maintain any kind of 
collective repose.  Under these circumstances, unsigning may well become 
more common, and in the process threaten the possibilities for international 
cooperation. 
Repairing the situation may require more sustained reflection on the 
synergistic effects on incentives for the various levels of entry, the several 
kinds of exit, and the desired intensity of treaty commitments.  But 
acknowledging the strategic issues involved, and moving past more doctrinaire 
legal analysis, is an important first step. 
